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2

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SYSTEM CONCEPTS, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Appellant,
vs.

Civil No. 18034

SHIRLEY M. DIXON, an individual,
Respondent.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 75, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and in accordance therewith, Appellant hereby responds to
Respondent's Brief on file herein.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant takes issue with Respondent's strong implication
that there was no consideration for Respondent's execution of the
proprietary

information

and

("Agreement") involved here.

restrictive

employment

agreement

Respondent did receive a promotion and

raise shortly after she executed the Agreement (Transcript at 42-43,
Exh. 12) and received the Agreement's stated consideration of continued employment with Appellant until she voluntarily terminated
such employment.

Significantly, the trial court specifically found

adequate compensation and consideration for Respondent's execution
-1-
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of the Agreement {Transcript at 43-44).
Appellant

also

contends,

contrary

to

Respondent,

that

Respondent, during her employment, was involved in the design and
development of Appellant's products.

Respondent testified that she

made design and operation suggestions in response to a specific
request

by Appellant.

Respondent's

suggestions

were

because of her knowledge of customer needs and desires

solicited
(Transcript

at 39-40, 15-18 Exh. 10).
ARGUMENT
I.
APPELLANT HAS MET ITS BURDEN FOR THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
SOUGHT.
At pages three and four of her Brief, Respondent cites
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §2948 to support her
contention that Appellant is not entitled to a preliminary injunction because Appellant has not clearly carried the burden of persuasion and has not met the primary requirement for a preliminary
injunction, that being evidence of irreparable injury.
Respondent's quote from Vol. 11 Wright and Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure §2948 is followed by an admonition that
[a]lthough these short hand formulations ['movant, by a clear
showing carries the burden of persuasion'] express the courts'
general reluctance to impose an interim restraint on Defendant
before the parties' rights have been adjudicated, they do not
take the place of a sound evaluation of the factors to granting
relief under Rule 65(a). l9_. at 429-30.
Wright and Miller also suggest that the most important prerequisite
for granting a preliminary injunction "is a demonstration that if it
is not granted the applicant is likely to suffer irreparable harm
before a decision on the merits can be rendered."
{emphasis

added).

Thus,

merely

"[a]
-2-

Id.

presently existing

at 431
actual
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threat must be shown," not actual or certain injury.

Id. at 437.

Appellant clearly has carried its burden in showing likely
and actual threatened harm to Appellant. There is substantial evidence in Respondent's testimony and Brief that Respondent was an
integral part of Appellant's marketing and sales program, was privy
to

confidential,

proprietary

information

(Transcript

at

15-18,

22-23, 25-28, 38, 40, 44) and had among her duties to Appellant compiling customer lists,

assisting in promotion,

sales leads (Respondent's Brief at 2).

As aforestated, Respondent

had input into Appellant's designs for
overwhelming

evidence

of

the

and coordinating

goodwill

its products.
Appellant

There is

built

around

Respondent during her employment (Transcript at 25-28, 46, Exh. 13).
There is no question that Respondent is now employed by
MetroData as its national sales manager which employment will continue during the pending of this action.

Respondent now has the

incentive and ability to and has in fact misappropriated the good
will

and

information

she

obtained

during

her

employment

Appellant for use by a direct competitor of Appellant
at 29, 44-45).
customers,

(Transcript

Respondent knows Appellant's actual and potential

their needs and desires and how Appellant.' s products

respond to those needs and desires.
marketing

with

strategy

and

in

fact

was

Respondent knows Appellant's
an

integral

part

of

that

marketing strategy because of the goodwill Appellant built for her
in the cable television industry.
Respondent's likely, threatened and actual misappropriation
of Appellant's confidential, proprietary information and goodwill
has and will cause irreparable injury to Appellant; such likely,
-3-
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threatened and actual injury will impair the court's ability to
grant an effective remedy absent injunction.
supra at 434.
tary terms,

Wright ana Miller,

"Injury to • • • goodwill is not measurable in moneand so often is viewed as irreparable." Id. at 439.

Respondent must, therefore, be enjoined.

The fact that injury may

have already occurred only supports restraining its continuance.
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND THE RECORD EVIDENCE DO
NOT SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW OR ORDER.
Respondent contends that the lower court's findings of fact
and conclusions of law are supported by the evidence.

Appellant

contends that the lower court's conclusions of law have no support
in

its

findings or

the evidence.

The fact

that Appellant has

approved the lower court's conclusions of law as to form cannot be
construed

as approval as to substance;

neither does Appellant's

honoring the time constraints of the trial court consitute waiver.
Appellant contends there is no evidentiary basis to support
the

trial court conclusions that i) "[i]ssuance of a preliminary

injunction • . . would prohibit Defendant Dixon from any employment
within the industry in which she is trained", that

ii)

hardship for Defendant Dixon would be created", that

iii) "[t]he

contract is a contract of adhesion," that

"great

iv) "enforcement of it

[contract] would create substantial hardship for Defendant Dixon,"
that

v) "plaintiff is not entitled to the equitable remedy of a

preliminary injunctio~," and that vi)

"[p]laintiff has failed to

meet the standards of Rule 65A . . . governing
mary injunction."

issuance of a preli-

Such far-reaching conclusions are not supported

by the findings from the record evidence of Appellant's corporate
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status, location and business; Respondent's employment by Appellant;
the language of Respondent's Agreement with Appellant; MetroData's
business; and Respondent's employment by MetroData.
Respondent's argument at page five of her Brief that the
lower court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are supported
by the evidence is replete with conclusory phrases such as "It is
obvious",

"As

the

conclusions

indicate",

"there

is

sufficient

evidence", but Respondent does not cite the findings or record evidence which supposedly support the lower court's conclusions of law.
Respondent's argument merely shows that the lower court made conclusions of law supporting Respondent's position; it does not show the
evidentiary basis for such conclusions of law

because there is no

such evidentiary basis.
III. THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT IN THIS ACTION IS PROPERLY ENFORCEABLE
BY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.

Respondent contends that the law cited by Appellant does
not

support

Respondent's

the

grant

of

a

preliminary

injunction

Agreement. Respondent contends that Allen

to

enforce

Y..:_ ~Park

Pharmacy, 120 Utah 608, 237 P.2d 823 (1951) is distinguishable and
Shaw

.::L!_

Jeppson,

121 Utah

155,

239

P.2d

745

{1952)

does

not

appropriately deal with the issue involved here.
The Allen case did
covenant

not

to

compete

according to its terms.
required

Plaintiff

to

res~lt

in a declaratory judgment that a

meeting
In Allen,

honor

the

its

criteria

is

enforceable

enforcement of the covenant
restrictions

on

his

future

employment to which he had previously agreed. This is exactly the
relief sought by Appellant against Respondent here, i.e.

that she
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honor

her

Agreement

which

provides

for

injunctive

relief

and

restricts her future employment.
Also, Plaintiff Allen, like Respondent in this case, did
make his agreement not to compete sometime after he was hired,
237

P.2d

at

824:

Plaintiff

Allen,

like

Respondent

here,

did

not negotiate the covenant not to compete, although he did negotiate

.!£.

other terms of his employment.

Furthermore, record evidence

shows that the area and duration of the covenant is necessary in
order to protect Appellant's nationwide marketing area and is thus
reasonable.
Admittedly the Shaw appellate opinion did not center on
the issue of enforceability of a restictive covenant by injunction
because such issue had already been determined in favor of enforceability and was not raised on appeal.

Justice Wolfe, however, in

his concurrence did cite Allen to support his view that restrictive
covenants are enforceable in accordance with their terms, including
enforcement by the injunctive remedy granted in Shaw. 239 P.2d at
748-49.
Furthermore,
Restatement

2d Agency

Appellant
§§

stands

395,

396

by

(1958)

its

citation

because

the

of

likely,

threatened and actual use by Respondent Dixon of confidential and
proper ietary

information admittedly

employment with Appellant
Such

is

a

major

factor

acquired

by her

during her

is an important aspect of this case.
of

the

irreparable

injury

caused

and

to be caused Appellant which gives the Appellant the right to the
relief it seeks.

-6-
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CONCLUSION
Respondent's Agreement meets the criteria of Allen and is
thus enforceable according to its terms, including enforcement by
injunction as was done in Shaw.
The trial court's conclusions of law, pursuant to which it
denied Appellant's motion for a preliminary injunction, have no support in the trial court's findings of fact gleaned from the record
evidence presented; therefore the trial court abused its discretion
in using such erroneous conclusions to support its Order.
Appellant has shown,

to the extent possible,

~he

irre-

parable injury caused Appellant by Respondent's going to work for
MetroData and the

irreparable injury to be caused Appellant if

Respondent is allowed to continue misappropriating Appellant's goodwill and proprietary information through continued employment with
Metrooata.

Hardship to Respondent can be mollified by security;

hardship to Appellant cannot.
reversed

and

directed

to

Therefore, the lower court should be
enter

a

preliminary

injunction

requested by Appellant.
Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of August, 1982.
PARSONS & CROWTHER

By~a~
~ons

-7-
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as

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Two copies of the foregoing Brief were mailed, postage prepaid,

to

Ellen

Maycock,

Kruse,

Landa,

Zimmerman

& Maycock,

Attorneys for Respondent, 620 Kearns Building, 136 South Main, Salt
Lake City, Utah this 2nd day of August, 1982.
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